Europe's closure with the communist past, and then assesses the impact of transitional justice measures in the closure with communism. Special attention is paid to the so called 'lustration', which in the view of the author performs important functions in transitions to democratic regimes, related to the reconstruction of a moral and rational community, and to the closure with the communist past. The article shows that the failures and controversies surrounding 'lustration' were due to its radical potential of reconstruction of a moral-rational democratic community, and also to specific socio-political factors of the post-communist ECE. What specific features of ECE post-communist transitions and of lustration conducted to the recurrence of debates related to the communist past is a question that has not been addressed heretofore, despite a fairly well-developed literature on post-communist administrative justice.
incompatibility between lustration and the rule of law. More recently, however, Monica Nalepa provided a game theoretic explanation to the recurrence of lustration enactments in Eastern Central Europe. 9 She also provided an answer to the question why governments dominated by former communists, opposing in principle to lustration measures, which have the potential to affect their political careers, enact such legislation many years after the fall of communism.
put their terrible past behind them, and to join efforts in the construction of a new, democratic polity. It also allows the institutions of the democratic state to consolidate, and offers legitimacy and authority to such institutions. Nevertheless, 'closure' is an elusive goal. As a concept, 'closure' receives more than one definition, and it is susceptible of conceptualisation in several distinct directions, not necessarily related.
Because the closure with the communist past seemed to be affected by ways in which we conceive closure, and by the means deployed for closing, our thesis is that the still impossible closure with this past has to do with the characteristics and purposes of one of the main legal devices employed for closure, that of lustration. 15 More specifically, we will argue that for particular reasons, among the various legal devices which can be used for closure, 'lustration' became the main legal device used for post communist closure. Further, we will argue that 'lustration' is more than a simple legal device, as it is seen sometimes in the literature. It is a radical measure, which in post-communist transformation was used in order to (re)establish by a single legal act not only a democratic polity, but also a moral one. 16 As a radical measure deployed to (re) establish a 'moral community', lustration was plagued by all the dilemmas and problems which in the moral debates affect the delimitation of the moral actors from the immoral ones. In addition, the opponents of lustration were able to use a particular strong meaning of 'rule of law' and other concepts found in the democratic discourse to focus the debate on the shortcomings of the legislation, and to divert the attention from the (re)distributive justice aspects of lustration. 17 Nevertheless the normative appeal of lustration was there to stay and probably shared by majorities in the ECE space. 18 And this appeal explains, in addition to politicians self interests, the initiation of cyclical discussion and adoption of lustration measures in some countries of the ECE space. 19 In order to defend this thesis, we will start with an analysis of several meanings of 'closure'. Then we will advance an explanation why a particular meaning of closure, related to the reconstruction of a democratic polity based on rational-moral agents, became so important in post-communism, and in general to transitions to democratic rule. We will further attempt to provide a link between this meaning of closure as reconstruction of a rational-moral democratic community and lustration, the post-communist transitional measure which, by force of the circumstances, became the exclusive legal instrument of dealing with the past. Additionally, we will briefly analyse how other different meanings of closure are related to transitional justice measures. We will also provide a tentative scorecard of the impact of other post-communist transitional measures on closure with communism. By doing this, we are hopeful to show that in the post-communist settings, the inconsistent and imperfect use of transitional justice measures, combined with particular evolutions of the state and society, led to an increased abstract demand for justice. Because after a decade of post-communist 'transition' the other transitional justice measures (criminal retribution and redress for victims) started to vanish from public agendas, the only transitional justice measure of salience left in the ECE space, by force of the circumstances, was lustration. 20 Nevertheless, the increased abstract demand for justice put a pressure on the politicians to enact some transitional justice measures. This pressure explains in part, the longevity of lustration. However, lustration itself is a complex device, which in order to be efficient relies on the availability of the communist secret services archives, and on the smooth functioning of the legal system of the country applying it. As none of these important conditions was met in the ECE space, with the exception of the former GDR, lustration was plagued by a myriad of problems which impeded on its efficacy. To exemplify some of these problems, we will finally provide a simple model of establishing reports with former regime actors and apply this model to the post-communist context.
We will conclude with a summary and with some predictions about the future of such legislation.
The post-communist closure concept and its challenges
Because the impossible closure we mentioned might have intuitively to do with our understanding of what is to close, why 'that' particular object should be closed, and the methods used to close, it makes sense to start the investigation of the causes which impede the closure from a definition of the object of closure.
On this purpose, we could assume first that 'communism', as a political and economic system was the object of closure. However, the problem of definition is complicated because no description of such an object can take place outside of a context. Communism, or rather the 'real existing socialism' which was implemented through the ECE space, meant more than one thing depending on the place and the time, and usually meant simultaneously several things. 21 As a system total domination of society, imposed from outside in most of the region, it meant a brutal destruction of all the democratic institutions of society, and their replacement with institutions totally dominated by the communist parties in the late forties and early fifties. 22 In various places and times, as for example in the GDR in '53, Hungary in '56, Czechoslovakia in '68, or Poland during most of the time, communism also meant waves of popular revolts, brutally repressed by internal or external forces led by the Soviets. In all the places after its consolidation, it meant at least in principle total control of the economy by the Party state, and an economy of perpetual shortages and deprivation, organised from the top down. 23 In addition, it also meant a pervasive and constant surveillance, which applied not only to the common citizens but also to the surveyors themselves and to their bosses. And as a rule, it meant a rigid state and bureaucracy, organised top down and totally dominated by the party, in which the law was a mere instrument and pure formality, and the truth was aggressively mystified by an ideology of total domination of the society. 24 On the other hand, from an economic or social standpoint, the 'real existing socialism' meant: "another tentative of the ECE self perceived periphery of Europe to modernise and catch with a perceived centre." 25 In its most dramatic period, 26 in parallel with the brutal destruction of the old cultural, economic, and political elites, socialism also meant at least for some, unparalleled social mobility in the modern history of these countries. 27 During and after that period, besides the endemic penury and widespread surveillance, it also meant a paternalistic state, which redistributed in one way or another the surplus accumulated. So despite communism's bias towards industrialisation at the expense of anything else in society, it was this redistribution and the large system of welfare which it entailed, that made the system supportable for a majority of population.
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An obvious response is that the negative ones have to be closed, In particular the total domination of society by the party state, with its accompanying long set of wrongs, as for example the brutal repression, truth manipulation, pervasive and constant surveillance, or the perpetual economic shortages and deprivation have to be 'closed'. 29 However, in the post communist context, such a choice of wrongs 'in need of closure' might not be a straightforward exercise, as the perceptions related to wrongs in the region were the product of a mixture of personal as well as ideological and cultural considerations. 30 Nevertheless, as all the successor regimes declared that they wanted to close the most egregious manifestations of communism as a political and economic system, and in particular the total domination of the state and society by the communist party, we could assume for the purpose of the argument a kind of uniform perception related to the object of closure, even if such uniform perception was lacking in reality.
Justifications and normative purpose of closure
If the object of closure was defined to include the 'communism' as a system, and more specifically the most egregious wrongs of communism, a second set of intuitive question related to closure might appear. The first such intuitive question is why should be 'that' object closed? And consequently, what purpose serves or it should serve the closing? In other words, what are the justifications of closure, and what is its normative purpose?
If the object of closure is taken to be the 'communist system', then there is no obvious or straight answer 'why' should such an 'object' be 'closed'.
For example, if one takes the common meaning of closure, as representing a "cessation of operations, termination or conclusion", she might say that because 'communism' imploded in the ECE, it was 'closed' by the act of implosion. The 'why' in this context is not a justification for action, but just an acknowledgement of a result produced by force majeure, or by an impersonal process of the society.
However, such representation of closure is objectionable on several grounds. First, it is objectionable because it does not answer the question why should be 'closed' the 'communist system'. Second, it is objectionable on the following ground. When we speak about societies it is implausible to think that all the institutions, which are common to all societies, including the communist ones, cease to operate following the implosion of a political system. And it is more plausible to think that such institutions will continue their functioning. As they continue their functioning, it is also plausible to imagine that some of their unpleasant features which characterised their functioning in the past would be conserved by inertia, at least for a period. In such a context, closure would imply the termination of these unpleasant features, respectively the wrongs associated with communism in our case. However, as the communist institutions survived by inertia, some of the unpleasant characteristics of the real existing socialism survived in the functioning of the society and its institutions after the implosion of communism, so these characteristics needed closure. 31 The imperfection of such closure explains why after the communism was declared deceased by implosion, a death certificate detailing the closure of its 'unpleasant' characteristics which had still to be produced was late in coming.
Third, the deterministic understanding of closure as an act of implosion of communism excludes the consideration of the role of people in the process of closing, which arguably counts for more. If communism imploded in the ECE, it did at least in part because of the people actions and beliefs.
When people took the streets in huge demonstrations against the ECE communist regimes in 1989 in spite of risks related to their physical integrity or their life, they did it so at least in part because they believed that socialism had became unsupportable. And that the daily moral and physical harm produced by communism was less bearable than the risk of getting arrested, tortured or shot by the communist regime's repression forces. 32 Therefore, it should be more in the 'closure' than just the bare acknowledgment of implosion of a political system, and it might have to do with the actions and beliefs of the people.
Nevertheless, in respect to people, closure has a meaning related to psychological trauma, and this psychological meaning becomes important in defining the parameters of closure.
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More important, in polities such as those of the ECE under communism, where harm to others was state sponsored, most of the subjects were traumatised in one way or another. So closure means healing, large scale healing, and in this process "dealing with the reality and consequences" of past abuse is essential, at least for victims and perpetrators. 34 Moreover, given its potential to eliminate the seeds of the future societal conflicts and to break an uninterrupted cycle of societal violence, the dealing with the past abuses became important for the society as a whole. 35 However painful, delicate and long are the processes which contribute to healing, the society had therefore an interest in their initiation and development, interest dictated by self preservation. 36 And it was this conceptualisation of closure as healing, which contributed in more recent transitions from authoritarian rule, such as those underwent in ECE, to a paradigmatic shift from impunity to accountability and confrontation with a nation's past. 37 Memory, reparations and criminal punishment were institutionalised and used as main vehicles for healing.
Nonetheless, in regard to trauma, and in particular to the universal and severe harm that produced trauma in communism, there are also moral and political philosophy insights which offer to the concept of closure with communism not only an additional and deeper meaning, but also important justifications. Although an extensive examination of the philosophical debates generated by these insights are well beyond the purpose of the present analysis, we will attempt provide a brief overview of them. On this purpose we will contrast the assumptions about the individual and community made in the 'Leninist model', as described by Alain Besançon, to the assumptions made in democratic theory about the individual and community. Thus, as a system of power, communism was based on widespread violence, and on the constant breaking of the first universal requirement of the morals, 'do not harm' the others. 38 These characteristics derived from the Leninist conception of inexistence of a common good as reason for which the political community exists, conception which was at odds with the Aristotelian and the classical conceptions on this matter.
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More completely, the communist project applied in the ECE derived from what Alain Besançon termed 'the three' levels of Leninist' Manichaeism, which could be described shortly as follows. 40 As there is no common good, there is no political community, and the State, being in the service of a class, has as function not the arbitration but the domination. There is no solidarity between social groups, and the proletariat does not acknowledge any duty towards other social groups. However, the class which the party-state serves is not that of a proletariat in the physical sense, but the idea of proletariat, as provided by ideology. Hence, the party, using the violence of the State, should also model the physical proletariat to resemble the ideal. So, the party-state is actually not engaged, nor has it any obligation toward the proletariat in a physical sense.
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And this follows from the fact that the party does not represent the proletariat because of a democratic delegation, but on the virtue of a mystical one. Therefore, the party is only engaged for the superior interests of the socialism, as defined by the ideology. And from this follows that at the centre of the party is not the stable personnel composed by professional revolutionaries, as some believed, but an immaterial one: the ideological knowledge. With the constitution of the party, the cosmic fight between good and bad had found its centre. 41 Nevertheless, this original Leninist political conception was not the only difference which made Lenin's political project so radically divergent from the classical democratic one. In addition to its political conception, as a totalising theory Leninism had also advanced an 'original' conception about the truth, and one in respect to ideology. With respect to 'truth', Leninism derived from its ontological dualism the dissolution of the truth, which it does not have any longer existence in itself, but is doubled.
42 "Truth of whom? Liberty, for what? …will respond immediately Lenin. There is no common reality…", in the words of Besançon. And it was precisely this introduction of a dualist way of thinking in a monist world, which was so at odds with the classical way of thinking, and it created so many intellectual problems for the 'bourgeois' political man who saw duplicity and (de) doubling of thinking where it was only a doubling of the reality for Lenin. Tactically brilliant as it was, this doubling of reality was not to solve the problem of the truth. The truth will return as a problem when the Bolshevik party took the power in Russia, and it was confronted with a social reality which did not quite match its expectations.
However, in case of conflict between the reality and what the party wanted, the ideology would be the ordering principle and ultimate arbiter of the conflict. Thus the contradiction between the social reality and that prescribed by the ideology was to be solved, as we known, in the favour of the ideology, by mystification of the truth to fit the ideological prescription. 43 And also by physical and psychological violence on a scale rarely encountered in the human history. From this original Leninist vision related to the role of the ideology, the communist political project in ECE never truly liberated itself, despite its innumerable mutations during its 45 years of existence.
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To sum up, the communist political project in ECE inherited from the original Leninist conceptions a series of assumptions and judgments which in their core are as follows: there is no common good in the political community, but a cosmic war between opposite forces; the force of good, represented by the party, is endowed with ideological knowledge which sits at the centre; the party does not owe anything to any social group and does not represents any class, but an ideational proletariat, on the virtue of a mystical delegation; there is a double reality and therefore a double truth; there is no common rationality but infantilised social groups which should be led by force, if necessary, by the depositary of the total knowledge towards the shinning future; when the social reality diverges from that prescribed by ideology, it should be moulded by force to fit the ideological one.
In sharp contrast to the Leninist conception, in the classical view of democracy the people are organised in a political community, and ruled by themselves. Cooperation becomes the salient feature in democracy, and not the total domination of society for the purpose of transforming it to the prescription provided by ideology, as it was for Lenin.
Further, while it is presumptuous to speak of general unified conception of democracy given the tremendous diversity among the classical and modern thinkers on the subject, one common assumption among different thinkers is that the people in democracy are rational. 45 This implies that persons endowed with rationality come in one way or another to make decisions which bind afterwards all, in the pursuit of a common good. Unlike the Leninist habitant of socialist polity who, if not in possession of the lights given by ideology was to be treated by the party-state as infantile and without rationality, the citizen of the democratic polity is assumed to be endowed with rationality and treated as such by his fellow habitants and the democratic state. Nevertheless, it is precisely this endowment with rationality, which makes possible to any person the understanding of the main moral requirement to not harm others, and in turn attach a new meaning to the closure with communism. To understand this meaning, imagine for example a communism agent who harmed others and now is supposed to become a member of a democratic polity that assumes its members to be endowed with (a basic moral) rationality. Practically, such a former communist agent who harmed others could only have two claims. First, she could claim that she is not endowed with the (minimum) universal rationality that enables her to distinguish the main requirement of the morals, and as a consequence excludes herself from the democratic political community. Or, she could claim her endowment with rationality, and become a habitant of the democratic space, In this case, however, she cannot discharge a priori the possible assignment of moral responsibility for her past acts, because the universal rationality and the morals it supports applies retroactively and take precedence over the 'communist' (i)rationality.
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In both situations a sort of exclusion operates as a result of democratic theory's conceptualisation of people as endowed with rationality. And a double constitution or reconstitution operates: one of a political community endowed with rational actors, and one of a moral community. This double reconstitution solves two of the most intractable problems inherited from the communism. First it solves the problem of the schisophrenic communist 'rationality', where rational actors had to justify the break of the main prescription of morals 'do not harm the others', on an unimaginable scale (as it was sponsored and sanctioned by the communist state). Second, it solves the problem of impossible societal cooperation under communism generated by the fear of the harm produced by others. When it rejects or sanctions the breakers of the moral imperatives, the double reconstitution of community operated by democratic theory's assumptions not only that it makes social cooperation possible again, but it returns to the fore the universal rationality, And it bases the functioning of the new polity on a radical different basis than that of the former polity under communism. In the end, by liberating the universal rationality from justifications and constrains imposed under communism, the reconstitution of community contributes to the healing of trauma produced by the communism's universal harm.
To conclude this discussion, we will say that closure with communism means from a democratic point of view a double (re)constitution, of a moral and rational political community. Having seen this, we should also note that this (re)constitution operates not only at a political level but also at a legal one, where criminal or administrative sanctions are imposed on the communist agents. 47 In addition, we should note that in the post communist context, the most radical double (re)creation of a democratic community by legal means was attempted not at the level of criminal law, by definition restricted, but at the level of the administrative law, respectively at the level of the so called 'lustration'. 48 Although the recreation of a moral and rational community was in general not posited expressly as a goal by the ECE legislators who introduced 'lustration' on the post communist agenda, a remarkable such manifesto is provided by the first ECE political program which projected the morality of public life as a major objective of post communist transformations. This is represented by the point 8 of the Declaration of
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Timisoara, Romania, of 11 March 1990. The declaration, largely ignored afterwards in media or scholarship, addressed the immediate post-communist context of Romania, where a former important communist, Ion Iliescu declared the intention of his quasipolitical organisation to transform itself in a party after it took over all the formidable machinery of the Romanian communist state, and to participate in the next round of elections, in spite of initial contrary declarations. 49 Because Ion Iliescu and his followers were perceived as liars and manipulators who had as undeclared goal to preserve the power in communist hands, the declaration of Timisoara addressed a set of principles under which the political life in post-communism should be organised. Although the point 8 of the declaration was clearly written with Iliescu's situation in mind, its language is more in the direction of a general political programme than it is toward a particular situation. As such, it is therefore applicable to all the countries breaking with communism. Moreover, it has the merit of defining, for the first time in ECE space, the moral responsibility of communist agents in the context of democratic transition, the sphere of those morally responsible, and also to project explicitly the re-constitution of a moral community as one of the major objectives of post communism.
Thus, accordingly to the point 8:
" Some authors did not escape to equal the legal manifestation of this reconstruction of a rational and moral space with a ritual cleansing. 51 If we recall that Besançon described the magic role performed by communist ideological propaganda in annihilating the differences between the reality and the ideological prescriptions, the comparison of reconstruction with a ritual cleansing is probably not out of mark, as it makes sense to liberate from the communist ideological spell with the help of another magic move. 52 Yet the legal device devised to reconstruct a rational and moral space by eliminating the communists from public life, that of lustration, not only that diverged sharply from the Roman lustrum that played such magical role and with which was compared, but had more mundane origins. 53 So, if it was dictated by magic at all, it was perhaps more in the sense of a quasi-religious comportment emptied of any religious significance described by Mircea Eliade, in one of the classical books related to transmutations of religious comportments devoid of initial religious significance in modern life 54 , than in a sense of a veritable ritual cleansing. And in any case, its value was not a religious one, but a very practical one from the perspective of the passage to a democratic regime.
Finally, we should note that in addition to the meanings described until now, closure with communism has also a meaning related to an historical and long term perspective. In this regard closure would mean a long collective psycho-social and political process, in which a prominent role would be played by the understanding of the collective and personal responsibility for the communism wrongs, and the forging of a new, democratic identity.
55
While the post-war western European experience of forgetting incommode truths was in many ways similar to the post communist ECE experience, 56 it is perhaps the term 'coming to terms with the past', the English equivalent of the German 'Aufarbeitung' (coming to terms with), 'Aufklarung' (enlightenment, clarification) and 'Vergangenheitsbewältigung' (mastering the past), that probably describes the best the processes involved in this kind of closure. 57 Although the horrors of the past which the West Germans had come to terms with were mostly different than those which the ECE citizens had come to, what probably unites the post-war West German's experience with that of the ECE space and make the German experience relevant to the ECE is the wholesale integration and of former officials of a totalitarian state in the administrative apparatus of new political regimes. 58 In this respect, what Theodor Adorno wrote a decade and a half after the fall of Hitler about the refusal of the West Germans to face the terrible Nazi past and to come to terms with such past, is also relevant for the ECE space:
he fact that fascism lives on, and that the much cited work of reprocessing the past has not yet succeeded, and has instead degenerated into its distorted image-empty, cold forgetting-is the result of the continued existence of the same objective conditions that brought about fascism in the first place…Now as then the economic order, and to a large extent the economic organization built upon it, together maintain a majority of people in a state of dependence on conditions which they have no control, thereby keeping this majority in a condition of political immaturity. If they want to live, they have no choice but to adapt themselves to the given circumstances, to conform; they have to put under erasure their status as autonomous subjects, which the idea of democracy appeals to; they can only maintain that status at the cost of renouncing it….Because reality doesn't provide the autonomy, or finally, the possible happiness that the concept of democracy actually promises, people are indifferent to democracy, where they don't secretly hate it….."
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To sum up, closure with communism means several things. In the first place, it means the cessation of the total domination of society by the party state, with its accompanying long set of wrongs (such as the brutal repression, truth manipulation, pervasive and constant surveillance, and perpetual economic shortages and deprivation).
In the second place, it means a large scale healing, which involves the confrontation of the past crimes and abuses, the condemnation of criminal agents of the former regime, rehabilitations of the victims, and forgiveness.
In a third place, it means the reconstitution of a political and moral community endowed with citizens who act as rational actors. In practice this reconstitution implies the attribution of moral responsibility for past wrongdoing to communist agents and their temporary exclusion from the political community in the context of democratic transition.
Finally closure with communism means a long collective psycho-social and political process, in which the understanding of the collective and personal responsibility for the communism wrongs, and the forging of a new, democratic identity would play prominent roles.
A scorecard of closure with communism in the CEE
After we have seen the possible meanings of closure with communism, we could briefly asses the results of the first two decades of post-communist ECE transformations, in order to see what provoked the remarkable obsession with the communist past in post-communist societies. Because the 'coming to terms with the past' could be characterised as still ongoing in the region, we could leave apart the assessment of the results of this psycho-social and political process associated with 'closure', and turn our attention to the other meanings of the term.
Thus, in respect to the processes associated to the first meaning of closure with communism, we should observe that most of the objectives implied by this meaning were remarkably attained almost immediately after the fall of communism. Political freedom was obtained, the party-state ceased to exist, free elections were held, and the communist secret services were transformed and no longer operated in the brutal ways they did under communism. 60 The only objective which was not successfully attained, at least in the first years after the fall of communism, was that of the economic deprivation and shortages characteristic of the socialist period. 61 Moreover, during these early years the economic conditions actually worsened dramatically for a majority of populations of the ECE countries, in comparison with the socialist period. More importantly, however, if a majority of citizens in the ECE countries were becoming quickly the economic losers of transition, the members of a substratum of the former communist elites became with astonishing speed the big winners of such transition, on a scale not imaginable during the previous period. And it was in particular this double phenomenon of the pauperisation of the majority in parallel with the enrichment of a minority linked with the communism, which with the time came to surpass the great political achievements of the early years of post-communism, and cast a big shadow on the directions of the transformations. If the result of post-communist transformation was the enrichment of a few members of the former communist elite to the detriment of a majority, then where it was the rupture with the former regime and the closure with communism? Theorised early in the transitional period by authors such as Senyi Andras Koro or Jawdiga Staniszkis, 62 and later enriched and amplified with subsequent contributions, 63 this narrative of transformation challenged the dominant triumphant paradigms of post-communist transformations such as those related to the triumphal end of history. It also offered an expression to some of the fears and anxieties of the ECE populations, and a description to the socio-political processes ongoing in the region.
Accordingly to this narrative, the separation from communism and the great sociolegal transformations of the early post-communist years in the ECE did not lead automatically to closure with communism and to the apparition of a modern, rule of law-based society and state. Moreover, it allowed for the perpetuation of some of the fundamental structures of the communist state in parallel with distorted or incapacitated state institutions. 64 As aptly remarked one of the observers of transformation:
"The disintegration of the ruling party in Easter Europe did not involve much of a change in the state apparatus...the state taken over by a Leninist party remained intact, now to be governed by parties elected by the domestic population"
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Among the fundamental structures of the communist state perpetuated in the transitional period, it was for example the 'socialist enterprise.' This was later exploited or 'privatised' mostly by the members of the former communist technocracy, in conditions of a weak or debilitated post-socialist state, and supplied one of the building blocks of the post-communist societal arrangements. 66 Arguably such dual process of survival and transformation of communist structures in post-communism contained at least two characteristics which enhanced an abstract demand for closure and for transitional justice measures. A first such characteristic was that the communist technocratic elite which initiated and benefited greatly from the post-socialist transformations could not reach its status in communism without a direct or indirect collaboration with the communist regime, and in some cases, with its secret police. 67 To take the representative example for the communist technocracy of a director of a regional communist enterprise, in general it might be said that such technocrat could not be selected as director of such unit from a poll of equally qualified persons strictly on the basis of her qualifications, but had to show some political aptitudes to pursue better than others the line of the party. 68 Similarly, such a director could not maintain her position, once selected, without the acceptance of the higher regional echelons of the communist party. As the communist system was highly hierarchical and oriented top down, the 'acceptance' means that the director was more 'able' than others to pursue at a minimum the 'plan' dictated by the party for the respective enterprise. Such 'ability' could take many forms, from the most severe one of making the life of all subordinates a hell in the pursuit of the plan, to the more elaborate and refined form of managerial control. Nevertheless, all such forms involved some sort of 'political' ability in addition to the director's technical ones, and a degree of collaboration with the higher echelons of the party, or with the communist secret police. 69 Once the communism collapsed, however, this 'political ability' and degree of collaboration with the communist regime would suffice to insert a communist technocrat displaying them in a loosely defined exclusionary category of wrongdoers of the former regime, contained in the screening and lustration laws. Nonetheless, such loose category included in lustration laws would also have to overcome extraordinary difficulties in conceptualising in a manner acceptable in a democracy the condemnable 'political ability' of the communist directors and other technocrats, since this 'ability' was based on unwritten organisational codes of the communist parties. In part because of such difficulties, a category of wrongdoing which would cover the generic collaboration of the communist technocracy with the former regime never became the object of an administrative justice measure in the post communist ECE, or of any sort of political exclusion. 70 While it would be mistaken to believe that this 'original sin' of collaboration of communist technocracy with the former regime was totally forgotten by the public, with the passing of years it could be expected a decay of emotions which would favour an abstract demand for administrative justice. Nevertheless, this did not happened, as a second characteristic of post-communist ECE transitions came into play. In brief, this characteristic consisted in the exploitation or transfer of the property of the former communist state to private hands by the former communist technocrats, in the context of widespread economic decline and worsening social conditions for a majority of citizens that characterised the first years of the ECE post-communist transitions. Happening on the spotlight of the press which covered a multitude of scandals related to such fraudulent transfers, the exploitation or transfer of state resources by the communist technocracy during the first years of transition was constantly associated with a perpetuation of the communist period's wrongdoing. And it therefore allowed for the continuation or enhancing of an abstract demand for administrative justice. 71 This demand was aptly exploited by populists a decade and a half later, during the bitter political ECE fights of the 2005-2007. 72 To conclude so far almost all the objectives associated to the first meaning of closure with communism, with the notable exception of the economic ones, were attained with remarkably speed after the fall of communism. However, the economic deprivation was not liquidated, but dramatically worsened for the majority of citizens of the former communist ECE, in parallel with a conservation or improvement of the economic status of the former communist technocracy. As the substantive moral guilt of the former communist technocrats was not beyond doubt, and important cases of enrichment of the former communists followed a pattern of praying on a weak and debilitated post communist state, the abstract demand for transitional justice measures and for closure with communism did not decrease but remained constant or increased. If this can be said with respect to the first meaning of closure, we should turn now to an assessment of accomplishments of objectives related to its second meaning.
As we have seen, the second meaning of closure relates to large scale healing realised by confrontation with the past, condemnation of criminal agents of the former regime, and rehabilitations of the victims and forgiveness. As we have also seen, in transitional justice theory such measures are important, as they allow to societies suffering from widespread and systematic political abuse to move forward toward democratic consolidation. However, in respect of this second meaning of closure, it should be said that closure with communism was at best partial. Announced with great fanfare immediately after the fall of communism, the condemnation of criminal agents of the communist regime quickly startled and then came to a halt all over region. 73 Non-retroactivity of criminal law, impossibilities related to juridical proofs of criminal acts committed decades in the past, or numerous other legal niceties similar to those invoked by the Nurnberg trial defence were major obstacles encountered all over the region when criminal punishment was seek for the communist agents. In the rare instances when criminal communist agents were condemned, humanitarian considerations came often into play. So the condemnation of former communist agents for crimes committed during the communist grip on the ECE could be considered at best as fragmented and partial, and overall as unsuccessful. Moreover, polarised political representations of the communist past consisting in wholesale condemnation or essential acquittal led to a large discrepancy between the political representatives' declarations and lived experience, which was to stay with post-communist societies. In addition, the rehabilitation of the victims and reconciliation could be appreciated as a limited and partial success. 74 The only domain were an overall success could be recorded was that of the official and public memory, where the communist official representations of the past suffered a mortal blow. Although the mushrooming of the Institutes of Memory in the region is not without perils, the impact of their prodigious activity is that the recent history of the ECE communist Europe is brought in line with what actually happened during the communist rule, and the gross mystifications of the communist regimes official history are gradually removed. 75 Finally, we should turn our attention to the third meaning of closure with communism, that of (re) constitution of a rational and moral democratic community. At its most basic level, this (re)constitution means complex operations related to the establishment of rapports with the former communist regime agents, according to statutes passed by the national legislatures. At the political level the establishment of such rapports then serves as foundational basis for the (re)constitution of a rational-moral democratic political community, while at the legal level it serves as basis for the application of administrative and civil law penalties. However, the establishments of rapports at the legal level are farther reaching than the application of administrative, labour or civil law penalties, although those are the most visible and discussed because of their immediate implications in the political and professional life of those sanctioned.
While we will limit our discussion to the administrative and civil law sanctions, we will keep this distinction in mind. In order to understand what these establishments of rapports involve, and what problems plagued the post-communist ECE attempts to establish such rapports, we should provide in the following section a simple model of establishment of rapports with the agents of an authoritarian regime, and then apply it to the ECE post communist settings. Before we proceed with the model, we should add a terminological clarification.
In general, the (re) constitution of a rational and moral democratic community in transitions from authoritarian rule to democratic government, involves the liquidation of the legacies of the repressive immediate past. In the ECE post communist context, two such specific legacies were deemed important; that of the former communist parties, and that of their fearsome secret services. Further, two administrative procedures were considered important in dealing with such legacies: that of screening to ascertain the truth, and that of removal or impeachment. In a narrow sense, the administrative procedure of screening of persons for their possible involvement in communist secret police activities is what became to be known as 'lustration', while the administrative procedures consisting in removal or impeachment of such persons belonged to what was named 'de-communisation'.
In a larger sense, while 'de-communisation' could be defined as "exclusion of certain former communist officials from running in elections or from occupying public offices in the new regime", 'lustration' could be defined as "the screening of persons seeking (or occupying) certain positions for evidence of involvement with the communist regime (mainly with the secret police apparatus)". If not specified otherwise, we will employ 'lustration' in its narrow sense in what follows, and administrative justice as a synonym for 'lustration'.
Having clarified these terminological differences, we should return to the model of establishment of rapports with the agents of an authoritarian regime, and to its possible application in post-communist ECE settings.
A general model of closure applied to the post-communist settings
Among the students of the political transitions, it is widely acknowledged that once a Regime change occurs, the new regime could not start to work in a vacuum, but has to establish somehow a relationship with the actors and subjects of its predecessor regime. 76 At the core of this relationship seems to stay a sort of double set of evaluations and judgments. The first set of evaluations and judgments is related to the former regimes institutions, structures and processes through which those former regimes interacted with the society. Such evaluations and judgments are made in the light of the values and goals of the new regime. The second set of evaluations and judgments of the former regime is related to the relationship of the individual to the political collective represented by the former regime. 77 At the end of this complex process, a role of the individual in the political collective of the former regime is assessed, and a relationship with the new one established.
While the above establishment of relations is characteristic of every political change, including those occurring in democratic regimes as a result of elections, in the context of a political change which implies a rupture in political regimes the establishment of L. Damsa relationships become, as a rule, more radical than in ordinary political changes dictated by electoral cycles.
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During the course of history, a variety of modalities have been used to establish the more radical relationships formed after ruptures of political regimes, and their outcomes ranged from outright condemnation and extermination of former regime's actors and agents, to wholesale amnesties or even amnesias. 79 Depending on the political circumstances in which the establishment of the relationships occurs, in the 'worst of the times' actors and agents of the former regimes could expect instant extermination. 80 In 'better times' they could expect mild political purges and vetting, while in the 'best of the times', they could even indulge themselves with a prominent career in the institutions of the new regime. 81 However, while in theory is recognised that arbitrary regimes may deal as they please with the former regime actors and subjects, it is further acknowledged that the democratic regimes are constrained in their actions by at least two factors. 82 First, the democratic regimes should give reasons supporting the nature of this retrospective relationship. 83 Second, if democratic regimes decide that they should deal with past injustices of former regimes' actors, they must deal with them through means and procedures consistent with constitutional standards of justice, such as the rule of law and equality before the law. 84 Historically, in modern political transitions, as for example those occurring after the WWII, the two simultaneous conditions were considered to apply strictly just in the case of criminal punishment, and were more or less lessened with respect to political sanctions. 85 Nonetheless, a more recent trend, and at least that of the East Central European regime change of 1989, was to consider the conditions applicable both to criminal punishment and to political sanctions. 86 As a consequence, the (rule of) law, which mediates the criminal punishment in modern political transitions such as those occurring after the WWII became paramount in the newer trend, and moved to the fore in the process of articulation of political sanctions. The dealings of democratic regimes with the former regimes actors and subjects became thus subjects of 'transitional justice'.
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To sum up, a democratic regime when taking over an arbitrary one has to establish a relationship with the actors of the former regime. In order to do so, it has to evaluate first the former regime institutions, structures and processes of interaction with the society, in light of its own value and goals, and then make a judgment of the actions of the former regime's actors.
However, it cannot evaluate and make judgments without giving reasons to support its evaluations and judgments, and could not decide to deal with the former regime actors without respecting means and procedures consistent with democratic standards of justice. And these requirements apply to both criminal punishment and political sanctions for past wrongs.
While the establishment of the relationships in case of criminal punishment may appear intuitively more controversial and complicated, 88 in reality it is the case of establishment of relationships which lead to political sanctions wrapped in the language of administrative and public law that is the most controversial and complicated. And this happens for a number of reasons, among which several are particularly important. The first one is that always the criminal punishment could target only a minority of actors and agents of the former regime, while the political and administrative sanctions target the many. 89 In addition, once a decision to reach for criminal punishment is taken, the subject of the former regime is cleared from the decisional process of the new regime and the judicial institutions enter the stage, assisted in their work by a stable body of the law. 90 Such stable body of law does not exist in the case of political and administrative sanctions, but has to be invented and attuned with the ever shifting goals of 'transitions'. In other words, while the criminal punishment decision seems to involve a onetime evaluation and judgment, after which the agent of the former regime is deferred to a more static process in which the judicial institutions and the law play a prominent role, the administrative political sanctions seem to resemble a more dynamic evaluation and judgment process, whose standards are more often changed and altered with the passing of time. But shifting standards, not well assisted by a coherent body of law, and with the potential to affect the many, contain in themselves the seeds of injustices and unequal treatment and raise additional difficulties in respect to their justification and coherence. Moreover, and in respect to their justification and coherence, the problems posed by administrative and political sanctions are further complicated by a collusion of intuitions and theoretical ideas of an earlier age of the humankind (that of the Enlightenment), with ideas from a later stage, that of ideologies dominating the twentieth century, As this collusion occurs in an undeveloped theoretical field, the field of reversion of a political system of the ideological age to a political system dominated by Enlightenment values, 91 the administrative political sanctions for past wrong become complicated and controversial.
To an exterior observer this process of assessing, however complex and mined with potential controversies might be, could ultimately appear simple and involving only gathering of information and a chain of mental operations effectuated on this information. In a first step, for example, the new regime collects information in respect of the former regimes institutions, structures, processes and agents. Then, on a next step, it establishes the former regime's declared goals, modes of operations and the outcomes of its actions on the society as a large. Further, it compares these former regime goals and modes of operation with its own goals and its desired outcomes of state actions on the larger society.
Thereafter, the new regime 'decides' what wants to keep from older regime's institutions and what wants to change in order to better accomplish its goals. As institutions are manned by people, preservation or change in institutions means ultimately judgments about the elimination or preservation of the people, made by the people. If the former regime institutions, goals and procedures are deemed antithetical to the new regime ones, this will translate in judgments about the former regime actors and employees perspectives to adapt and function in a changed environment. 92 Therefore, these actors and employees of the former regime would be evaluated in order to be seen how they could fit in the changed institutions. 93 Finally, the new regime 'justifies' the decisions 'it' has reached and submits the justification, if necessary, to impartial third parties to the process, such as the courts. Although complex, this process should not be a complicated matter.
Whoever thinks so in rapport to post communist administrative justice is however mistaken. In the first place, the very concept of information regarding the vanished regime and its actors is in post communist ECE not a fixed one but is exceedingly elastic. 94 Firstly, accordingly and true to the Orwellian quote: "those who control the past will control the future", the process of information gathering became like Kundera's proverbial struggle of memory against forgetting a struggle of certain groups to tie information down against other groups who would keep its edges flexible, uncertain, and amorphous. In practise the most notable aspect of this struggle translated in post communist ECE settings in the long lasting controversies surrounding the communist secret police archives, and the access to personal files kept by these services. Although the issue of archives was prompted to the attention of the post-communist law makers by a wave of scandals related to the destruction of secret services files, 95 it took more than six years to the country considered most aggressive in pursuing anti-communist policies to enact legislation regulating the status and access to such archives. 96 And it would probably take more than two decades to the most lenient countries to enact similar legislation. In the meantime, the archives were privatised, as were the other assets of communist state, generating even more scandals. 97 Moreover, while the decision to leave aside the files of communist parties and to 'focus' on the communist secret services was in itself controversial because it ignored the substantial guilt issues and missed the chance to compressively cross check the records, 98 nobody bothered to observe that the destruction was in itself a criminal act accordingly to the communist regime statues, or to criminally prosecute the destructors of such files. Instead, the argument related to destruction was turned to its head. 99 Secondly, the idea of a 'new regime', when taken in a larger sense of meaning, respectively that of a 'system of rule' than endures despite the fact that governments come and go, implies a sort of coherent structure linked by common shared goals of its participants.
100 But in the post communist East Central Europe political landscape, participants as diverse and opposed in their experiences and political conviction as for example were in Romania Corneliu Coposu, 101 and Ion Iliescu, 102 always mixed in the political workings of the 'new regime.' So such a regime represented as a coherent initial 'system of rule' could hardly be imagined.
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Such a system was very much in the making in the beginning of the post-communist Period, as it still arguably is after two decades of 'transition', and its parts were there for grab. 104 Thirdly, in the hectic and contradictory political environment of the first months or years after the fall of communism, clear goals or objectives of transformations were hardly to come. And this was visible even in the country which at the time was regarded as taking the most radical and farthest reaching lustration approach, Czechoslovakia, where the new leaders had no idea about the general direction in which the intelligence services should go or otherwise were not able to impose a minimum political oversight on such services until late in the transition. 105 In the absence of clear goals, the establishment of relationships started to fluctuate accordingly to dubious political priorities of the moment, with the result of compromising the integrity of the whole process in the interim. How the integrity was compromised could be better understood if we compare the ECE post-communist processes with those taking place in Western Europe after the WWII. Thus, in most of the Western Europe after the WWII extensive lists of persons, "who did not behave as they should" during the war were used to establish administrative and civil law relationships. In addition, the wrapping in administrative language of political sanctions applied to these persons was based on uniform reversal of usual assumptions of non-guilt and non-retroactivity.
Unlike the situations in Western Europe after the WWII, the establishment of relationships in post communist ECE involved a potential more extensive list of persons. However, the identity of such persons could never be fully determined with precision because the access to archives was lacking and because the criteria for inclusion in the list were the result of a political compromise and fluctuation. In the end 'the list' became a very limited one, in which persons were selected on highly disputable grounds, based on a cloudy cocktail of non-guilt or non-retroactivity principles mixed with collective guilt and retroactivity-based assumptions. As a result of these differences, while the coherent establishment of relationships and political punishments led after the WWII to enforcement which was harsh, uniformly or speedily applied, and short lasting, the establishment of relationships became in ECE a perpetual affair, slowly and selective applied and forever lasting. 106 Fourthly, the establishment of relationships in post communist ECE was further complicated by the fact that a whole political generation active in the first two decades of transition was tainted by collaboration with the communist regime. As the state was the sole employer in the communist ECE there were no social mobility perspectives or career opportunities for ambitious persons outside the magic circle of communist state and party.
Unlike in Western Europe after the second war, or in Germany after unification, in the post communist ECE they were no political or economic elites untainted by collaboration. When dissidents existed and come to power in the region, not only that they lacked political experience, but were in general unable to constitute long lasting nuclei of outsiders of the communist regimes which could occupy the higher moral ground in the moral debates of the transitions. The former dissidents when in power also lacked a shared vision of the future or the past, and had very soon to include in their own political ranks ambitious persons of the former communist regime if they wished to save their own political future.
The price paid for the inherent political compromise reached with the former communist agents by the former dissidents' political movements was that such movements could not claim any longer clear boundaries for the establishment of relationships, even if they wanted to do so. In addition, as the opportunities of malfeasance multiplied or increased during a golden age of enrichment at the expense of the state which followed the fall of communism, the boundaries became more and more blurred, since 'magnificent reformers' and staunch anticommunists freely passed the line of corruption and greatly benefited of a continuous weakness of the state, which they tolerated and encouraged. 107 Although the determination of boundaries or establishment of relationships was not, and perhaps is still not so difficult for a majority of the population of the ECE countries, as the communist past is still in the living memory, what became in time difficult and hard to accept for such populations were the skewed and ever shifting relationships and boundaries with the past proposed by a political class that became more and more homogeneous. Therefore, the narrow window of opportunity to radically reconstruct a democratic community in which the democratic institutions enjoy a high level of trust and legitimacy, offered by the spectacular fall of the communist regimes in the ECE, was probably lost for good because of the post-communist politics of establishment of reports with the communist regime agents. 108 And the overall low levels of trust in the democratic institutions recorded less than a decade after the fall in the ECE, the low electoral turnaround of the later period, or the public perceptions of the new democratic institutions as inefficient and corrupt are all signs of this missed opportunity.
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Although it would be mistaken to believe that the implementation of administrative justice measures alone was sufficient to enhance the legitimacy and public trust in democratic institutions in the absence of other comprehensive legal and bureaucratic reforms, it could be also argued that 'lustration' was, nevertheless, one of the first such necessary measures to be taken in a succession of cumulative and mutually supporting steps, having as ultimate goals the enhancement of trust and legitimacy in democratic institutions, and the (re)constitution of a moral-rational political community.
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Done arbitrarily and hesitantly as it was done in post-communist ECE, lustration further compromised the efficiency of the other measures which could support lustration and exercise a cumulative effect on the reordering of the political community. Thus, frustration with lustration's results combined with the frustration provoked by other imperfect transitional justice measures, and enhanced the abstract demand for transitional justice.
In the end, however, when we asses such measures in the post-communist ECE world, perhaps we should not lose from the sight the long historical perspective and the complexity of the process. As the post war transitional experience of the Western Europe countries teaches us, even in better socio-political and economic circumstances than those of the post-communist ECE, there are no miraculous solutions for dealing with a repressive past. The collaboration with the Nazis, or the purges that followed after the WWII still haunt these nations collective memory many decades after the events.
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Although we perceive administrative justice from a legal point of view as a temporary device, its political-philosophical, and socio-psychological foundations collude with such legal perception. In exemplifying such collusion, we need not go further than to think that if the administrative justice measures are 'temporary' in the sense they should be applied or enacted not far in time from the fall of an authoritarian regime, their effects are permanent. At the same time it is true to say that the legislative elaboration and enactment of administrative justice (or other transitional justice) measures is not a perfect exercise, but an imperfect one, in which much is learned by trial and error.
Thus, administrative measures are perfected and enacted long after an authoritarian regime falls, as shown by the experience of the ECE post communist countries. These countries knew in the past decade a revival and enactment of administrative justice measures from a 'second generation ', 112 in which the similar experiences of other countries which underwent the process of democratisation arguably played a role. And in this respect Marek Safjan is probably right when it states that: "Rather than wild justice or no justice at all, post-communist transitional justice policies have offered partial justice, and therefore constituted a politically feasible and morally defensible solution that was, nevertheless, far from being perfect." 
Conclusions
As we have seen, closure with communism means several things, among which the cessation of the total domination of society by the party state, the end of perpetual economic shortages and deprivation, confrontation of the past crimes and abuses, the condemnation of criminal agents of the former regime and the reconstitution of a rational-moral political community are important.
The only place where the post-communist ECE countries registered a spectacular closure almost immediately after the fall of the communism was the cessation of the total domination of society by the party state. As a matter of fact, these countries became remarkably democrat and plural. However, this extraordinary success was shadowed by failures in other aspects of closing with communism.
For example, the partial and fragmented condemnation of criminal agents of the communist regime led to a large discrepancy between lived experience and the bombastic political (declarations of} criminalisation of the former regime.
More important, the prolonged and often impossible reconstitution of a rational-moral political community left important substrata of the former communist elites in position of command in the post-communist state and society.
Later, the members of such substrata were able to further weaken and exploit an already weakened post-communist state, contributing this way to a worsened economic deprivation of a majority of citizens, in the first years of post-communism.
Although by the end of the first decade most of the countries of the region recovered from the economic decline, the ways in which the huge transfers of state property in private hands enriched some of the members of the former communist elite were not forgotten as well as the hesitant ways in which the post-communist states dealt with their judiciaries, police forces, or established new institutions capable to enforce the law efficiently or to fight the economic criminality of the transition. In the end, it can be argued that all these imperfect closures increased an abstract demand for transitional justice and closure.
The multiple economic and political scandals, which shook the political landscape of the region, are in part a testimony of this impossible closure, inasmuch as it they are the result of an extreme polarisation and of the fight for resources of the post-communist state.
Gradually however, we also witnessed in the past decade a revival of administrative justice and enactment of administrative justice measures from a 'second generation'. Albeit the moment of a radical reconstitution of a rational-moral political community by means of administrative justice had passed, such administrative justice measures could still clarify disputed points of the recent past, and contribute to the reconstitution of a more democratic, rational-moral political community.
For the immediate future, we should not expect the administrative justice debates to stop entirely. As the longer historical perspective teaches us in respect to closure with a disputed past generated by a dictatorial or totalitarian regime's wrongs, there are no miraculous solutions for dealing with such an authoritarian or totalitarian regime's legacy, and the closure is a long and arduous process.
L. Damsa

Notes
1
In general the debate related to the communist past is centered on several recurring themes. One first such theme is related to the disclosure of the names of former communist secret services agents and collaborators Because in the most ECE space there was not sustained effort to make the communist secret services archives available to the public, political battles and scandals related to 'unauthorized' disclosures from such archives occurred with regularity during the last two decades. A second theme is related to the role of the communist secret services and member of the , 1995) , p.51 and subseq. We should revisit this issue, but for now suffice it to observe that the first years after the fall of communism contained sufficient daily injustices for the citizens of Central Eastern Europe countries. As the economic hardship and rampant inequality became soon the rule in the region, it was easier and convenient for the incipient political class to blame the failures of economic policies or the absences of political programmes on persons, especially when the absence of personnel changes in the new polities was so widespread. And with the time, the focus on persons and not on institutions or policies became so conveniently embedded in the new political game that it was used not only by the anticommunist politicians but also by politicians belonging to the communist successor parties. A brief analysis of various meanings of the term 'closure' reveals why is so difficult to close. Thus, accordingly to Prof. Paul Humphrey's 'closure' entry in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy: "As used in philosophy, a domain of objects is closed with respect to some relation just in case the relation never holds between sets of objects some of which are inside the domain and some outside. One of the most common applications is to causal closure: physicalists hold that physical events are closed under causation -nothing physical is caused by anything non-physical such as mental events, nor do physical phenomena cause mental phenomena. In logic, a domain is closed under a set of operations if the result of applying any of those operations to a member of the domain results in something that is itself in the domain." (for a detailed discussion of the 'Epistemic Closure Principle' see Steven Luper's similar entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Heuristically, this definition suggests that the impossible 'closure' of communism might have to do with the ways in which sets of mental 'objects' (traits, characteristics, concepts) which are inside the domain (communism) are attempted to be closed by the applications of sets of mental object that are 'outside' the domain (liberalism, for example). Although Gunther Teubner's twelfth camel of law might reformulate the domains and help the solving of the puzzle as it did in the old Bedouin story, the contribution of law in solving the problem is questionable. Later exponents of this view saw closure as the basis of all inequality, be it that of material reward, status honor including ethnicity, caste, and even the nomenclature system of communist regimes…. Processes of social closure involve marginalization (or exclusion), on the one hand, and incorporation (inclusion) on the other…" Thus, accordingly to the social closure understanding, a closure with the communist past might meant two different things; an exclusion of the former communist elites, or a process of transformation of older communist closure in a different kind of closure. And, as we will see, both processes were theorized in the scholarship regarding post-communist transformations. In additions to the above, closure has also a psychological meaning. Brought around 1910 by the Gestalt school of therapy in Germany into psychology to describe the way scattered and troubling feelings can resolve themselves in coherent and stable mental patterns, it came to means coming to terms emotionally with psychological trauma. In most of transitional studies discontinuity and legislation are sometimes analyzed separately, and sometimes together. When they are analyzed separately, the analysis purports to establish the difference between the actual discontinuity or legislation and some normative variant of discontinuity or legislation adopted by the author. When they are analyzed together as is usually done in impact studies, the legislation is evaluated in respect to discontinuities it produced, albeit more complicated models in which discontinuity and legislation are simultaneously evaluated from a normative standpoint could be found in the literature. Although we share the idea of dominant paradigm in respect to the discontinuity, we advance a different view in respect to the purpose of one of the main transitional devices used for closure, vetting and purges. administering the immense domain of the state, characteristic to communist societies. Such divesture was realized mainly by 'privatization' and 'restitution', legal devices which could be explained as 'distributive justice' measures. In the condition of such divesture of the state from administration of communist property, accomplished by transfers of property realized by 'privatization' or 'restitution', the former managers of socialist property, not replaced as administrators of such property, could manipulate the new legislation related to privatization and restitution in order to carve for themselves a big share of resources transferred from the state to private entities (by 'privatization' or 'restitution'). In other words, these former communist managers belonging to the technocratic communist elite could be a major recipient of the distributive policies followed in the post-communist space. However, 'lustration' targeted among other communist regime actors, such technocratic communist elites. If 'lustration' has as effect the replacement of such elites before 'privatization' or 'restitution' occurs, then such elites could not benefit the 'distribution' operated by the post-communist regimes by way of privatization or restitution. And in this regard we speak about the potential effects of lustration to affect the major 'distribution' operated by the post-communist regimes. Given the limitation of space, we cannot discuss here in any depth this issue, but a more in depth analysis is provided in our forthcoming doctoral thesis with the University of Warwick. For similar limitation of space, we cannot cite here all the relevant literature on 'nomenclature' privatizations or the ways in which these former elites benefit the 'distributive' policies followed by the post communist states. Rummel, who spent a great lot of time attempting to document the number of victims of various totalitarian regimes in the XX century, felt even the need to coin a new term 'democide' in order to suggest the mind blowing number of victims resulted in the XX century as from state repression or criminal activities of authoritarian or totalitarian states. Second, the repression was not equal in all the countries in the region, and varied across the time in each country. Each wave of popular revolt which occurred in one country, as for example the GDR uprising in 1953, or the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, the Polish revolts in the fifties or sixties, the Prague's Spring in 1968, the Romanian Miners revolt in Valea Jiului in 77, the Polish revolts in the 70's, or the Solidarity movement in the eighties could provoke bloody repressions in the country in which it occurred, but with the exception of a state of higher alert of the other communist countries security services, of their national armies or of the Soviet forces eventually stationed in these countries, lesser repressions in the other countries of the Socialist bloc occurred. And mass repression was avoided especially when the society of these countries did not revolt en masse or otherwise followed the example of their 'socialist brothers' from the country in which the revolt first occurred, as was in general the case. Third, the repression varied across the time in each country, following a general trend to diminish after the fifties. With perhaps the exception of Romania, Albania, and Poland during the eighties, which because of particular circumstances became more repressive while the others attempt to liberalize their regimes, the general trend in the seventies and eighties was towards a relaxation of the regime, albeit truly 'relaxed' was probably only Hungary. Of course, this does not imply that any of the communist regimes of the region lost significantly its capacity to repress with brutality any revolt, if it desired to do so; it only implies that the large scale brutal repression of the forties and early fifties ceased to be the model. So, given the various waves of repression several generations of victims in these countries could be encountered, with a major proportion of victims given everywhere by the members of the generation who fall under the savage repression of the Stalinist era, but with significant differences among the communist countries of the region between the younger generations of victims, function of particular wave of repression in each country. Thus, we could expect for example to see in Hungary, in comparison with the Czech Republic, victims who are a decade older than the Czech ones, given the fact that the Hungarian revolution and the repression which followed occurred 12 years earlier than the Czechoslovak Prague's Spring. This fact is perhaps not without any relevance, in respect to the victims' agendas or even the possibility to prosecute the perpetrators, albeit we have numerous other variables which influence the possibility of prosecution, and therefore differences between prosecutorial results among each country.
Nevertheless, the number of former agents of communist 'security' services and repressive apparatuses (including the police, paramilitary or prosecutorial services), or communist bosses responsible for the repressions condemned for their participation in repression is dim in all the countries of the region, including the former GDR, where energetic prosecution was contemplated and undertaken during the early nineties. Therefore, Monica Nalepa's argument about Poland and Hungary could be somewhat extended to the whole region, as we will show later in the article: "In countries such as Poland or Hungary, the first few years of the transition aftermath brought little transitional justice activity -some trials were initiated here and there, but overall, there was nothing spectacular" (see Monika Nalepa op.cit). And in respect to Hungary and Poland themselves, the following decade after the fall of communism did not bring much. "Opportunities abounded, particularly at the lower lungs of the ladder and in government employ: there were jobs to be had, apartments to be occupied at subsidized rents, places in schools reserved for the children of workers and closed to the children of bourgeoisie.
Competence mattered less than political reliability, employment was guaranteed, and the burgeoning Communist bureaucracy sought out reliable men and women from everything from block organizer to police interrogator". Judt at p.176. In other words: "The revolution of state socialism was, in a way, the revolution of mediocrity", in Berend, op. cit at p.55. Afterwards, the social mobility decreased, and in respect to the elites the patterns of an earlier period ironically returned in late socialism. In the words of the late Joseph Rothschild: "Who composed this political elite? Not the direct genealogical descendants of the interwar bureaucratic-intelligentsia-gentry elite. That elite was toppled, or at least swamped, by the upheavals of World War II and the massive, rapid Stalinist injection during the post-war period of veteran Communist cadres and levies of newly radicalized 'red-diploma" workers and peasants into the corridors of power. Yet the old, ousted elite took its 'Hegelian revenge' ("mankind makes its history behind its own back") by transmitting many of its styles, traits, and values to these usurpers, who, in turn, made sure that their own children, rather than another generation of upstart workers and peasants, would inherit their positions and privileges. Thus the corridors of power became blocked to authentic workers and peasants, just as they were during the interwar era, while a highly politicized party and state bureaucracy mimicked the gentry-intelligentsia pretensions of the interwar bureaucracy, aped its smugness, and replicated its nepotism, reigns, and rules. The socially closed nature of this self-protecting and self replicating elite was redoubled by the prevailing patterns of access to higher education. All the ideological rhetoric supposedly favouring the children of manual workers and peasants indeed became mere rhetoric, as the proportion of university students from these 'toiler' backgrounds declined. Not surprisingly, "the moral and psychological gap of the 1930s between the elite and the masses also replicated itself in the 1980s." Joseph Rothschild and wrongs are the product of a mixture of personal as well as ideological and cultural consideration". Pogány, id., p.10. We should also keep in mind that closure has a more fluid meaning in states' political regimes transformations, as some of the vital functions of the state have still to be exercised. So closure means the cessation of some operations, but also a transformation of the vital operations in something done accordingly to different values and goals of the new regime. For example, if we take the case of the communist secret police, closure means cessation of the operations of these institutions against political opponents, and the redefinition of goals to be achieved by intelligence activities. Therefore, lato sensu, closure also means a transformation of the goals, values and operations of such institutions, as much as it means cessation or termination of many of the former activities. 31 We should keep in mind that closure has a more fluid meaning in transformation, as some of the vital functions of the state have still to be exercised. So closure means the cessation of some operations, but also a transformation of the vital operations in something done accordingly to different values and goals of the new regime. For example, if we take the case of the communist secret police, closure means cessation of the operations of these institutions against political opponents, and the redefinition of goals to be achieved by intelligence activities. So closure means also a transformation of the goals, values and operations of such institutions, as much as it means cessation or termination of many of the former activities. 32 Similarly, when the reformist communist party leaders entered the talks with the opposition, or staged the removal of fossilized leaders from the top positions, they did it only because they perceived that the communist parties' positions were untenable as a result of mass protests and the reluctance of the repression forces to intervene. The communist reformer probably knew better than anyone else in the region that the street protests were just the iceberg of a profound unpopularity of the communist government and the speed with which the communist regime disappeared in the ECE demonstrate how unpopular these regimes were, and how fragile their grip on society, in the absence of repression. 33 'Closure' in this psychological context mean a situation where the trauma is no longer seen as unfinished business, requiring, for instance a compulsion to take revenge. Grief and loss no longer plague the individual consciously or unconsciously, and the victim lives not in a state somewhere between denial and obsession, where the loss is to a large degree accepted and incorporated into the functioning of everyday life. 34 Neil J. Kritz: Coming to terms…, op. cit., at p.128. 35 Kritz, id. 36 Such as grieving, accountability, forgiveness, and rehabilitation of victims and perpetrators.
Kritz, id. 37 Kritz, id. 38 The widespread violence should not be understood just as physical violence, such as torture or murder, but in a larger sense, which includes psychological violence as well. In the 45 years of communist rule in the ECE, the violence as the main mean to govern society, transgressed from large scale physical violence of the early years to the insidious, mostly psychological violence of the final years. But the essence of communist grip on power remained the same, and was based ultimately on the resort to violence. 39 For the Leninist conceptions on the political community see Besançon, Chapter 13: Political Leninism, in Besançon, Les Origines…, supra. Besançon attaches this conception to Lenin's exceptional Manichaeism. For Lenin the society was polarized in classes, which could not form a political community. Per Besançon: "There is no common good and no friendship." There is just hate and war, and "The scope of politics is to destroy the adversary." The space does not allow treating otherwise than by a succinct mention the monumental trilogy edited by of Oligarchy could be a better explanation for how the fossilized system worked, than the Besançon analysis of the earlier, Leninist phase. But this is a debated point, and the visions among the western and eastern scholars often diverged on this issue. As the late Seymour Martin Lipsett informs us (see Lipsett, supra, EN 14) there was widespread dissatisfaction among the western sovietologist with the pure totalitarian model in the seventies and eighties and an attempt to bring the soviet system analysis in line with more contemporary social sciences preoccupations derived from the developed west. On the other hand, the eastern dissidents returned in their analyses of the system during the same period to the totalitarian model. While the transformations of the Soviet and its ECE satellites system should be acknowledged, and the bureaucratic fossilization and the lost of ideological drive should be recognized, we think that is should be mistaken to believe that the initial features described so aptly by Besançon were abandoned in the last years of the communist rule. What perhaps disappeared was the early impetus to totally change society by force, to bring it in line with the ideological version, as the regime become more defensive. But as Ceausescu case shows in Romania, this disappearance of impetus was a variable of the local factors and personalities of the party bosses, and not a sign that the Leninist justifications described by Besançon vanished from the communist parties system of thought. 46 In general the rationality could not be divided conveniently, so you could claim that in the past you were irrational but now you are. You have it, or you have not. Evidently that in the real post-communist world there was not so simple to introduce rationality this way and to link it to morality and truth. Because an administrative exclusion from the democratic community had serious consequences as it was followed by civil and professional sanctions, major debates and political battles were fought around the issues of who should be excluded and for what, and in these battles of words the major controversies of the field of moral epistemology were imported, together with the controversies surrounding moral dilemmas and moral principles, as they should. Nonetheless, these acrimonious debates have a positive side, in the measure they forced the people to think about the morality, rationality and truth relations with both communism and the new democratic polities. 47 The space does not allow us to further explore the philosophical justifications of punishment and the relations between the reconstitution of a moral and democratic political community and punishment. A good restatement on punishment justification in a democratic society is provided by , and where the killing and repression were severe. As time went by and Iliescu and his organization, the National Salvation Front, were unable to produce the authors of the killing, but several known perpetuators appeared on his entourage, the people participating in the revolt grew more and more impatient. The series of manifestations and street protests, albeit organized by a minority of the population, continued in several Romanian towns almost incessantly, until after the Romanian first 'post-communist' elections of May 1990. Timisoara was at the time the second town in importance after the capital to organize such manifestations, but as a moral symbol was considered even more important than the capital, Bucharest, as its people were the first to revolt against Ceausescu. In June 90 Iliescu decided to call upon the miners from 'Valea Jiului', a central part of Romania, to put an abrupt end to such manifestations in Bucharest, the capital. The ensuing generalized civil conflict and the scenes of brutality which where broadcasted around the world made from Iliescu and his regime an instant international pariah and raised serious questions about the democratic commitments of Romania. 50 The whole text of Point 8 is as follows: "As a consequence of previous point, we propose that the electoral law shall prohibit for the first three consecutive legislatures the right to compete, on any political party's list, of any of the former communist activists or officers of Securitate. Their presence in the political life of the country is the main source of tensions and suspicions that churn the today's Romanian society. Until this situation is stabilized and the national reconciliation takes place, their absence from public life is an absolute necessity. We also ask for the introduction in the electoral law of a special paragraph which bans the former communist activists' candidatures for the office of the president of the country. The office of the President of Romania has to be one of our symbols of departure with communism. To be a member of the [communist] party is not a fault. We all know on what extent was conditioned the life of the individual under communism, from professional achievement to the receipt of a dwelling, by the red card, and what serious consequences could attach to its surrender. Activists, however, were those people who have abandoned the profession to serve the Communist Party and to enjoy special privileges offered by it. A man who made such a choice presents no warranties on the moral warranties of the kind which should be provided by a President. We also propose the reduction of the prerogatives of the Presidential office, after of the socialist enterprise role in post-communism: "These emerging patterns of encystment and transience were a logical outcome of certain features of work organization in socialist firms-which as Simon Clarke suggests, had a certain affinity with feudalism." The soviet enterprise is almost as different from the capitalist enterprise as was a feudal estate from a capitalist farm. Like the feudal estate, the socialist enterprise is not simply an economic institution but is the primary unit of soviet society, and the ultimate base of social and political power. This unit provided all manner of services and facilities for its labour force (housing, kindergartens, sporting and cultural facilities, clinics, pensions, etc). The collapse of the party state reinforced the tendencies of personalism and patronage inherent in such arrangements, making many people dependent on their locality, their workplace, or their boss for access to food, housing and loans. Belonging to a suzerainty, by having a regular job or enjoying some other tie to a powerful and successful patron, meant dependence, but as in feudal times it also meant at least minimal security." Verdery, op. cit. at p.200. For the characteristics and incentives to elites offered by the post-socialist state, see generally Venelin Ganev, op. cit. 67 A degree of collaboration with the secret communist police was mandatory for the top management of enterprises in the so called 'sensitive' branches of national economy, considered of high importance by the communist party, or in the case of the enterprises organized by the security services themselves with the approval of the top echelons of communist parties. There were many such enterprises in all the communist ECE countries, and a detailed legal-economic analysis of their mode of functioning will not add much to the argument. Suffice it to indicate that Maria Los, supra, gives a description of the ways in which such enterprises were organized in Poland towards the end of the communist regime, description which in our view generally fits the ways in which such enterprises were transformed in post-communist ECE. 68 In fact, the selection started much earlier, during the primary and high school when the student enrolled in the communist youth, usually a precondition to become a member of the communist party, and also in the university, where the political activity of the student was taken in consideration for higher grades. Between two students of equal capacity and preparation, the final differentiation in grades was given by the political activity. If one had activity in communist youth during the university and the other has no activity, the activist received the highest grades, which place him better for occupying the best positions at the end of study, as the system of distribution of graduates was highly centralized. Of course, such obscure 'selection' effectuated on the basis of operational codes and not on enacted laws operated during the whole professional life. Peasant Party and an important political figure of the first decade of the Romanian transition after a remarkable transformation from public enemy of the 'new regime' to the national most important moral figure, was a survivor of more than twenty years of harsh communist extermination camp and a former political hope of the interwar prominent Romanian Peasant Party. 102 A nomenklaturist and a great political hope of the Romanian communist party, before and after his golden exile as a second rank nomeklatura member order by Ceausescu himself as a result of Iliescu's more reformed vision of the communism. 103 With the exception of some dedication and commitment to economic reform and democratic change, whatever this reform or change meant. It is ironic how the subject of economy, painfully avoided by the dissidents before the communism fall because of the taboo imposed by the communist regime, became under the constraints of the transformation the first and foremost one to be tackled. On the avoidance before the fall of communism of the subject, and its causes, see In general we should observe that the measurement of influence of lustration on the popular trust in the democratic institutions, respectively on the legitimacy of such institutions in postcommunist transitions, is a difficult enterprise. The surveys of the period generally measured the general level of population's "the trust in various democratic institutions, and no surveys containing trust and legitimacy as variables of lustration were conducted. In the absence of such surveys a general approximation of the interplay between lustration and trust and legitimacy could was usually done by using proxies. Such proxies are for example the popular vote for ex communist parties which opposed explicitly in their political platforms to lustration measures, or the comparisons of level of trust in democratic institutions between ECE countries applying different lustration measures. Such proxies are problematic, and could be used at best only for an indirect argument. In the case of the vote for ex communist parties, for example, lustration was at best a marginal topic in such parties' political platforms or elections debates, and it could not be easily isolated among the other issues of the period. Moreover, its importance in the vote for ex communist parties could not be easily ranked, and is difficult to discern among the ex communist parties voters for whom determinant for the vote was the position adopted by these parties towards lustration. If we see the vote for ex communists in Hungary and Poland in 1994 as a negative response to the economic decline provoked by the economic measures adopted by the first post-communist governments, as it is seen sometimes in the literature, we could further doubt that the ex communist parties opposition towards lustration measures was so important in attracting votes towards these parties. Finally, the comparative assessment of the level of trust in democratic institutions among the ECE countries applying different lustration measures is also problematic, as the trust is not perhaps more influenced by the efficacy or perceived fairness of such institution than by lustration. However, on the basis of such comparisons it could be rejected at best the argument that lustration and purges lowered the level of trust in democratic institutions. For a general evaluation of the higher trust in rapport with the pessimistic predictions of the former GDR population public trust in the institutions imposed by Western Germans, It is interesting to observe than one of the objection related to the enactment of lustration laws was the contention that lustration, as well as prosecution, or other punitive measures fail to achieve extensive moral, legal and political ends sought in by the successor polity, such as the advancement of respect for the rule of law or tolerance of peaceful political dissent. However, as the former GDR statistical polls suggest, comprehensive lustrations and purges imposed even from outside did not necessary lower the level of trust and legitimacy of the democratic institutions or the rule of law, in comparison with countries which did not traversed such purges. Moreover, when combined with the establishment of new and efficient law enforcement agencies, capable to enforce the law impartially and to curb the economic criminality made possible by the large transformations of economy, the trust in democratic institutions or the rule of law was even greater in the former GDR than in the countries which did not implement lustration or purges. Evidently that the enactment or implementation of lustration and purges alone were not sufficient to enhance the legitimacy and public trust in democratic institutions to the level reached in the countries which combined lustration with other comprehensive reform of post-communist bureaucracies, as a comparison between Czechoslovakia and the former GDR, the two ECE countries that enacted lustration measures early and applied the thoroughly suggests. If, as in the case of Czechoslovakia, the reform is piecemeal, proceeds hesitantly, and combines with other defects of democratic institutions and transformations, with or without lustration the new bureaucracies are not perceived by the public as well as the post-communist bureaucracies are perceived in the countries which combined lustration with other comprehensive reforms of bureaucracies (GDR). Therefore, what seems to count most in rapport to public perception is how the bureaucracies are reformed and able to perform effectively. Nevertheless, the indications that lustration and purges alone did not lead to levels of public trust and enhancement of the legitimacy of post communist democracy comparable to countries which accompanied such measures with comprehensive other reforms are not proofs that lustration and purges failed to achieve the desired goals. Moreover, the alternative, with no lustration, vetting or reform as applied in most of the former USSR space provide ample evidence of post-communist evolutions in polities which barely have any resemblance with democracies. So it could be said that the post communist experience with lustration in the ECE and former USSR space, rather than providing a clear case against lustration, it provides more a case for the negative implications of amnesia and amnesties in respect to democratic consolidation. 
